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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
William Simpson )    Docket No.  2017-08-0805 
 ) 
v. ) State File No. 46115-2017 
 )     
City Auto, LLC, et al. )     
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Deana Seymour, Judge )
  
Affirmed and Remanded – Filed June 13, 2018 
 
In this interlocutory appeal, the employee alleged he passed out at work due to excessive 
heat, fell, and struck the concrete floor.  The employer argued the employee’s syncopal 
episode was caused by an unrelated medical condition, the accident was idiopathic, and 
the claim was not compensable.  The trial court determined the employee had come 
forward with sufficient evidence to indicate a likelihood of prevailing at trial on the issue 
of compensability and awarded medical and temporary disability benefits.  In addition, 
the trial court denied the employee’s request for attorneys’ fees.  Both parties appealed.  
We affirm the trial court’s decision and remand the case. 
 
Judge Timothy W. Conner delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding 
Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, and Judge David F. Hensley joined. 
 
Monica Rejaei, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employee-appellant/appellee, William 
Simpson 
 
Gordon C. Aulgur, Lansing, Michigan, for the employer-appellee/appellant, City Auto, 
LLC 
 
Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 William Simpson (“Employee”), a 59-year-old resident of Shelby County, 
Tennessee, worked for City Auto, LLC (“Employer”), as an automobile technician.  
Employer had two shops on its premises and, on June 20, 2017, Employee was working 
alone in what the parties referred to as the “second shop.”  Both parties agreed that the 
interiors of the shops become extremely hot on summer days.  Although the shops were 
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not air-conditioned, Employer provided industrial fans to help circulate air, as well as ice-
cold water, Gatorade, ice-cold towels, and popsicles.  Employee estimated that, even with 
the fans operating, it was between 115 and 120 degrees inside the shop on a hot day. 
 
On this particular date, Employee had been working alone in the second shop 
when he started to feel hot.  He sat down, drank some water, and put a wet towel around 
his head.  Because he continued to feel bad, he decided to walk to the other shop and 
report to his supervisor that he was not feeling well.  With respect to this point, the 
testimony of the parties differed.  Employer’s witnesses testified Employee came into the 
main shop and began to discuss a problem with the lift that was used in the second shop 
to repair vehicles.  The service advisor to whom Employee spoke when he entered the 
main shop, Stephanie Oakes, denied Employee made any comments about feeling hot or 
experiencing other heat-related symptoms.1  Nevertheless, both Employee and Ms. Oakes 
testified that during this conversation, Employee started to have difficulty speaking, 
turned pale, and then stumbled backwards.  Ms. Oakes stated that Employee “zoned out 
in a way, kind of like hazy eyes . . . and then just fell backwards.”  When he fell back, his 
head struck the concrete floor, and he remained unconscious for an unknown period of 
time.2 
 
Employer called 911, and paramedics arrived at the scene.  After regaining 
consciousness, Employee told the paramedics he did not recall the fall and stated he did 
not want to be taken to a hospital.  Ms. Oakes testified Employee was “pretty 
disoriented” after the fall, and a co-worker took a photograph of the back of Employee’s 
head to show him where he was bleeding.  Various co-workers encouraged Employee to 
go to a hospital but, ultimately, at Employee’s request, Employer’s shuttle driver drove 
him home. 
 
Employee testified he insisted on going home first because he did not want to 
worry his wife.  When he arrived home, his wife immediately transported him to a local 
hospital where he was admitted.  Employee testified he remained in “neurology ICU” for 
“18 to 20 days.”3  He was diagnosed with a traumatic head injury and has been treated 
primarily by Dr. Ahmad Al-Hamda, a neurologist.  Employer denied Employee’s claim 
for workers’ compensation benefits, asserting Employee’s injuries were idiopathic in 
nature and not compensable. 
                                                 
1 Employee described Ms. Oakes as his “boss,” but Ms. Oakes testified that, as a service advisor, she 
discusses service repair tickets with the technicians but has no supervisory responsibilities over the 
technicians. 
 
2 Medical records from Baptist Hospital (“Baptist”) indicate Employee suffered a “traumatic subdural 
hemorrhage with loss of consciousness of 30 minutes or less.”  He was also diagnosed with “hypertensive 
heart disease with heart failure” and “anxiety disorder.”  Another provider at Baptist noted Employee 
“had syncopal episode[,] hit head[,] and had roughly 2 min [loss of consciousness].”  In that same report, 
“occupational exposure” was listed as a risk factor. 
 
3 Medical records from Baptist indicate that 7 days of his 18-day hospital stay were spent in ICU. 
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At the expedited hearing, Employee stated he continued to experience difficulty 
speaking, could not focus on tasks, and had memory problems.  He claimed he cannot 
drive, cannot return to work, and will be forced to retire.  In addition, Employee denied 
any history of strokes, seizures, or prior head trauma. 
 
Following the expedited hearing, the trial court determined Employee had come 
forward with sufficient evidence to indicate he would likely prevail at trial on the issue of 
compensability, and it ordered Employer to provide both medical and temporary total 
disability benefits.  The trial court also denied Employee’s interlocutory request for 
attorney’s fees.  Both parties have appealed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the 
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.  
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2017).  When the trial judge has had the 
opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give 
considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court.  Madden v. Holland 
Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009).  However, “[n]o similar 
deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.”  
Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at 
*6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018).  Similarly, the interpretation and 
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with 
no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions.  See Mansell v. 
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013).  We are 
also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, 
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a 
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2017). 
 
Analysis 
 
 At an expedited hearing, an employee need not prove each and every element of 
his or her claim by a preponderance of the evidence in order to obtain temporary 
disability benefits or medical benefits.  See McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 
No. 2014-06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ 
Comp. App. Bd. Mar. 27, 2015).  Instead, an employee has the burden to come forward 
with sufficient evidence from which the trial court can determine that the employee is 
likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits consistent with Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-239(d)(1).  Id.  Thus, while an injured worker retains the burden of proof at 
all stages of a workers’ compensation claim, a trial court can grant relief at an expedited 
hearing if the court is satisfied that the employee has met the burden of showing he or she 
is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1). 
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On the other hand, “this lesser evidentiary standard . . . does not relieve an 
employee of the burden of producing evidence of an injury by accident that arose 
primarily out of and in the course and scope of employment at an expedited hearing, but 
allows some relief to be granted if that evidence does not rise to the level of a 
‘preponderance of the evidence.’”  Buchanan v. Carlex Glass Co., No. 2015-01-0012, 
2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 39, at * 6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 
29, 2015).  On appeal, it is our responsibility to conduct an in-depth examination of the 
trial court’s factual findings and conclusions, see Wilhelm v. Krogers, 235 S.W.3d 122, 
126 (Tenn. 2007), within the mandate set out in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-
6-217(a)(3) (2017) and 50-6-239(c)(7). 
 
Idiopathic Fall 
 
 In its notice of appeal, Employer asserts the trial court erred in determining 
Employee’s injuries were not caused by an idiopathic fall.  This is a misstatement of the 
trial court’s rationale.  Instead of concluding Employee’s injuries were not caused by an 
idiopathic fall, the trial court determined that, even if Employee’s fall was caused by an 
idiopathic condition, his injuries are compensable “if an employment hazard causes or 
exacerbates the injury.”  McCaffery v. Cardinal Logistics, No. 2015-08-0218, 2015 TN 
Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 50, at *10 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Dec. 10, 
2015) (internal citation and quotations marks omitted).  The trial court then noted three 
factors supporting its determination regarding medical causation.  First, Employee 
testified without contradiction he was working in a hot, humid, and dusty shop when he 
began to feel ill.  Second, the trial court relied on Dr. Al-Hamda’s opinion that 
Employee’s syncopal episode was causally related to his hot work environment.  Third, 
the trial court noted no other medical proof had been offered suggesting any other cause 
of Employee’s syncopal episode. 
 
 We addressed a similar argument in Frye v. Vincent Printing Co., No. 2016-06-
0327, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 34 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 
2, 2016).  In that case, the employee alleged she became dizzy due to exposure to a 
workplace chemical, resulting in a fall.  Id. at *2-3.  In response to the employer’s 
argument that the employee’s fall was idiopathic in nature and not compensable, we 
noted, “an accidental injury arises out of employment when there is apparent to the 
rational mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between 
the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting 
injury.”  Id. at *13-14 (quoting Phillips v. A&H Constr. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Tenn. 
2004)).  With that principle in mind, we affirmed the trial court’s interlocutory award of 
benefits.  Id. at *14-15. 
 
In the present case, Employee’s unrefuted testimony was that he was working in a 
hot, humid, and dusty environment when he began to feel ill.  Within five minutes of 
walking to the main shop, he began to stumble over his speech, became pale, and fell 
backwards, striking his head on the concrete floor.  Moreover, in response to an inquiry 
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from Employee’s counsel, Dr. Al-Hamda agreed that Employee’s dizziness and 
subsequent loss of consciousness were “a direct result of working in heated temperatures” 
and that the working conditions “contributed more than fifty percent (50%) in causing his 
injuries, considering all causes.”  Dr. Al-Hamda also wrote a letter stating Employee had 
suffered a “traumatic brain injury from heat stroke,” and that Employee had been unable 
to work since the date of the incident.  Employer offered no evidence of a pre-existing 
medical condition that could cause dizziness or a loss of consciousness, and offered no 
medical opinion contradicting Dr. Al-Hamda’s opinions.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that 
Employee is likely to prevail at trial in establishing the compensability of his claim. 
 
Denial of Attorneys’ Fees 
 
 Employee has appealed the trial court’s denial of his interlocutory request for 
attorneys’ fees, asserting the trial court erred in determining this case does not fall within 
the “extremely limited circumstances” supporting such an award.  See Thompson v. 
Comcast Corp., No. 2017-05-0639, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *31 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 30, 2018).  In support of his argument, Employee 
asserts that an interlocutory award of attorneys’ fees is justified because Employer:  
(1) reached its own medical conclusion that Employee’s injuries were due to an 
idiopathic condition without obtaining an expert opinion; (2) continued its denial of the 
claim even after receiving Dr. Al-Hamda’s responses to Employee’s causation inquiry; 
and (3) failed to seek an expert medical opinion contradicting the opinions offered by Dr. 
Al-Hamda.  Moreover, Employee offers two policy arguments supporting its claim for 
attorneys’ fees.  First, Employee asserts a ruling in favor of awarding attorneys’ fees at an 
interlocutory stage of the case would “discourage employers from blanket denying claims 
absent [a] legitimate basis.”  Second, Employee argues such an award would “show 
counsel that represent injured workers in Tennessee that they can be compensated for 
their zealous advocacy.” 
 
 In Andrews v. Yates Services, LLC, No. 2016-05-0854, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. 
Bd. LEXIS 22 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 8, 2018), we addressed an 
interlocutory request for attorneys’ fees.4  Id. at *5.  In affirming the trial court’s decision 
to deny the employee’s request for attorneys’ fees and expenses based on an alleged 
wrongful denial of a claim, we first noted that the statute “vests the trial court with 
discretion to award or not to award attorneys’ fees and expenses” and that “we will 
review any such decision under an abuse of discretion standard.”5  Id. at *12.  Second, we 
                                                 
4 This was the second appeal in that case.  See also Andrews v. Yates Services, LLC, No. 2016-05-0854, 
2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 35 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 23, 2017). 
 
5 As explained by the Tennessee Supreme Court, “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when a court strays 
beyond the applicable legal standards or when it fails to properly consider the factors customarily used to 
guide the particular discretionary decision.”  Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 
2010).  
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emphasized that a trial court could consider whether the employer’s decision to deny a 
claim was “incorrect, erroneous, or otherwise inconsistent with the law or facts at the 
time the decision was made.”  Id. at *13.  Third, we noted that, “in evaluating an 
employee’s claim for attorneys’ fees and expenses, a trial court may consider not only 
information reasonably available to an employer at the time the denial decision was 
made, but also pertinent, additional information or subsequent events that bear on the 
denial decision.”  Id. at *13 n.5. 
 
 In the present case, the trial court quoted our opinion in Thompson for the 
proposition that an interlocutory award of attorneys’ fees and expenses should be made 
only in “extremely limited circumstances” due to the “uncertainties inherent in litigation, 
the limited issues typically addressed at expedited hearings, the fact that discovery and 
medical proof often are incomplete at an interlocutory stage of a case, . . . and the fact 
that a trial judge’s determinations at an interlocutory hearing are subject to change at any 
time prior to the entry of a final compensation order.”  See Thompson, 2018 TN Wrk. 
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *28-29.  The trial court then determined that “this case does 
not fall within ‘extremely limited circumstances’ to justify an award of attorneys’ fees at 
this interlocutory stage.” 
 
 Employer argues that the causation inquiry Employee’s counsel sent to Dr. Al-
Hamda was incomplete or misleading.  Employer also asserts that the medical records 
submitted to date revealed no evidence of “heat stroke” or other heat-related maladies 
that caused Employee’s syncopal episode.  Next, Employer argues that Employee failed 
to establish any “special hazard of employment” that caused or contributed to his injury, 
because he suffered a syncopal episode of unknown cause, fell straight back, and struck 
nothing during his fall other than the floor.  Under the circumstances, we cannot conclude 
the trial court abused its discretion in denying Employee’s interlocutory request for 
attorneys’ fees.6 
 
Conclusion 
 
 We conclude the trial court did not err in awarding temporary disability and 
medical benefits based on its determination that Employee is likely to prevail at trial in 
establishing the compensability of his claim.  We also conclude the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying Employee’s interlocutory request for attorneys’ fees.  The 
trial court’s order is affirmed in its entirety, and the case is remanded to the trial court for 
further proceedings. 
                                                 
6 With respect to Employee’s policy arguments, we note that nothing prohibits Employee from re-
asserting a claim for attorneys’ fees and expenses at the final compensation hearing. 
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